

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL	<input type="checkbox"/> SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Breckinridge	10 Feb	J
2			
3	Mr. Leader		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks: <i>Scott - FYI</i> <i>Very useful -</i> <i>Please classify.</i>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
<i>J. Leader</i>			<i>2/10/77</i>
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10 Feb 77

Source: Notes made by A. Goodpasture
for John Leader, IG StaffSubject: Background on Mexico Station Support Assets
(Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)

1. Unilateral coverage. From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April 1947 (by Bill Doyle) until arrival of Win Scott as COS in 1955, Charles Anderson III (still in LA/HQ) had developed a support apparatus to [REDACTED] exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy. This umbrella type project (LIFEAT) consisted of multi line phone taps, three photo sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation.

a. Phone taps were placed by an employee of the telephone company ^{retiring in March 1948} who was handled by David WILSTED (pseudo). The number of lines tapped was limited ^{by} availability of a listening post nearby (since the taps were not made in the main central) and English/Spanish (Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc) transcribers. Generally these agents (mostly Mexican or Mexican American) were related (which the station at that time felt was good security in that if they talked about shop, they would talk to each other.)

b. Three photo sites were handled by Anderson with the help of Harry Mahoney (retired, living in Chicago) and TDY TSD people checking the best type of camera, film, and concealment devices. These had sub-scripts under LIFEAT (LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site bang opposite across the street from the front gate of the Soviet Embassy which had both a vehicle and foot entrance. The Soviet gate was on the NorthWest corner of their compound and LIMITED was diagonally across a double barrelled street on the Southeast corner of [REDACTED]

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that block. LIMITED was the first base and it operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. I think the Mexi Station bought one storey this property (a/Spanish Colonial stone house) through LIMOUSINE (check to be sure). Later this house began to fall apart. This base was closed when the Station got word that the photo of "uniden man" was being released to the public by the Warren Commission. The photo operators were moved to another apt nearby. The property was sold (under an operational agreement with LIMOUSINE for a long term lease on the top floor of a new apartment blding to be built on this site). LILYRIC was planned as an alternate photo base to LIMITED. It was in an upper storey (3rd floor -check) on the same side of the street as LIMITED but in the middle of the block South. It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. The agents in LIMITED and LILYRIC (both Mexican families) as far as we knew, were not acquainted with each other. LILYRIC was a rented apartment. LICALLA, the third photo site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the South side of the Soviet Embassy compound which the Mexico Station purchased in about 1958 (check date), also using LIMOUSINE as the purchaser (check). This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of the Soviet personnel (who at that time were largely unidentified in Mexico Station records). The three photo sites were handled by Ramon Alvarez (Mexican citizen of U.S. mother who taught elementary level at the American School). Ramon collected the film ~~all~~ ^{from} from LIMITED and LILYRIC three times a week. His sister's husband, Carlos (Mexican doctor) developed and printed the film into 8x10 contact print strips. The master plan was for LICALLA film to be processed ^{but} ~~inside~~ TSD man from 1957 to 1959 (Harper Holt - resigned) could not handle the volume and as the unprocessed film began to accumulate, the inside CO (Mahoney) became disgusted and took the film out for Ramon's brother-in-law to process (probably early 1959). Thus Ramon became the handler for all three photo bases. A sensitive staff D monitoring operation

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was run out of another one of these houses (crypt for the four houses was LIMUST/1, etc.). This was handled by Glen WIDDEN (outside TSD officer) and Mahoney using HQ TDY teams for monitoring. This operation was also separate from LICALLA. The two houses in between were rented to unsuspecting tenants.

c. Mobile surveillance was developed by Anderson and later placed under Mahoney and Joseph Sancho. This team consisted of a half dozen or so agents who used three to four late model cars and a panel truck (which could be used on stakeouts for photo coverage). The plan was to activate this group by radio (from LIMITED BASE) Soviet when someone of interest left the Embassy gate and stay with them until they made their meetings. These agents knew about the LIMITED BASE because they had LIMITED photos for identification purposes. This worked fairly well until about the middle of 1958 (check date) when one of the surveillance agents got too close to his target and was arrested by the Mexican transit police and turned over to the Mexican Secret Service. By the time the Station could arrange through a cleared attorney to bail him out (Judd Austin of the Goodrich, Little and Riquelme firm), the agent had identified Sancho (who was evacuated across the border at Nogales by Bob Shaw) and the inside phone number of Mahoney (who was subsequently replaced by Louis Puckett). As a result of this flap, the LIFEAT project was broken up into several others. The agents were not changed but were given Frank new crypts. Estancons and Peggy Maggard replaced Anderson in handling the unilateral phone taps. Puckett replaced Mahoney and handled the surveillance team (LIENTRAP) and the photo bases through Ramon.

d. LIBIGHT was the crypt used for a unilateral (originally) mail intercept handled by Charlie Anderson III, The agent (Mexican) had a semi official status and arranged to obtain selected letters from

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a sub-agent in the postal system (I think at the airport). His case officers Alfonso Spera, were later/Puckett, Robert Feldmann, and Alan White.

2. Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican DFS (Direction of Federal Security) with which we dealt was a hip pocket group run out of the Ministry of Government. This Ministry spent a major part of its time on control of foreigners and political investigations. Their agents were vicious, venal, corrupt extortionists. Robert Melberg established contact with one of them ^{George} Levine De Leon (later LIFIRE group) in about 1950 or 51. He gave them some training (a group of about five surveillance types) in travel control working the airport as well as file searches of names from DFS Hqtrs where the files were poorly organized and often inaccurate. Now and then, however, some useful information was developed but it could not be depended upon. Melberg was replaced by Phil Roettinger (resigned and remained in Mexico), Mahoney, Thomas Hazlitt, and Robert Feldmann ^(one after the other)

During 1958, Win Scott met socially some of the chronies of the Mexican President elect, Adolfo Lopez Mateos. During this period, the U.S. Ambassador Robert C. Hill (reflecting the policy of then Sec State J.F. Dulles) was energetic in organizing groups to "fight communism". One of these seeds grew into a proposal Miguel Aleman (jr. son of former Mexi President), acting for Lopez Mateos, made to Win Scott for a joint telephone tap operation. This project (LIENVOY) went through about four distressing years of a shakedown. The Mexican in control (LIELEGANT) was inexperienced, old, and greedy. His son (LIENVOY-2) was a masterpiece of deceit and corruption. LIELEGANT also manipulated control over the principal agent of LIBIGHT mail intercept. The first case officer was Alfonso Spera inside with Turner Smith (retired) outside and John ^{(TSD training officer for surveillance and head of the listening post where thirty telephone lines would connect as well as a transcription room}

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staffed by Mexican army officers.) Initially the station tried to meet every demand made by the Mexicans. Both Smith and John had language difficulties and personal problems associated with being outside the station so that the Mexicans were virtually uncontrollable, spending money as they pleased, squirrelling away equipment at enormous costs, and neglecting their part of the bargain in the production of transcripts or placing taps which we wanted. Spera was replaced by Jack Brady who found himself in the same pincer movement of having Scott approve a request by LIELEGANT that Brady had turned down by the son, LIENVOY-2. Finally when the cost became exorbitant and there was little to show for it, the project was revamped. Smith and John returned to the U.S. and were replaced by a TSD officer, Charles Flick, who was put inside the listening post to maintain Brady was reassigned to other duties pending a transfer. the equipment./ Scott took over the project as case officer meeting with LIELEGANT. He designated Ann Goodpasture to meet dailing with Flick for routine supervision of the listening post, picking up transcripts and tapes. Goodpasture had no dealings with the Mexicans except when Scott was ill or out of town. Generally, all decisions were made by Scott. This was about late 1961.

3. My memory is a little vague about the origins of the Cuban Embassy but I think the staff first developed from a pro-Castro group celebrating on New Years eve 1959. As I recall, it was a makeshift arrangement of volunteers through most of 1960 and 61 with Tom Hazlitt producing voluminous reports on their activities and recruiting agents right and left among Cuban nationals in Mexico City.

4. Personnel assignments. Of interest to us now is who was in Mexico during the period prior to Oswald's visit and the subsequent investigation by the Warren Commission. To determine who was there and what they were doing I have grouped persons together chronologically with areas of their assignment as the covering from 1950 to 1969 so that ~~xxxxxx~~ names pop up, one can tell what period they were in Mexico and ^{that} their assignments ^{were} at the time.

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8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS 7/56 - 7/58 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)
 10/58 - 12/62 Warren Dean (retired)
 6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired) —
 10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watson (retired in Mexico)

COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954 Howard Hunt (retired)
 12/54 - 7/58 Williard Hill (resigned)
 12/56 - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)
 Chief
 9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C/(retired) —
 8/62 - 9/64 Gunnar Beckman Asst —
 2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C/(retired) —
 9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst
 10/65 - 1967 Stanley Watson C/(retired)
 66 - 68 Don Heath
 68 - 71 Joseph Smith C/(retired in Mexico)

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief
 2/60 - 4/62 Jack Stewart (retired Costa Rica)
 4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief —
 9/63 - 7/65 Ray Swider —
 10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay (retired) —
 8/63 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired) —
 9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccolo
 10/65 - 12/67 Peggy Maggard

SOVIET TARGET

6/57 - 10/59 Louise Lyon (retired)	6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)
9/59 - 8/65 Herbert Manell Chief —	(retired ?)
9/59 - 8/65 Barbara Manell —	Outside CO
5/64 - 7/66 William Bright	
4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann	
6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger	
7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief	

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS

6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)
 6/58 - 6/63 George Misko —
 6/63 - 70 Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico) —

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SUPPORT ASSETS

Unilateral phono taps

1949 - 1961	Charles Anderson III Chief	49-71 ? Outside CO
4/55 - 4/60	Peggy Maggard Asst	David WILSTED (ps)
4/56 - 1/62	Frank Estancona Chief	retired in Mexico
2/60 - 10/64	Thomas Keenan -	
9/64 - 12/67	Michael Farmer	

Unilateral photo Cubans

6/59 - 4/64 Robert Zambernardi (resigned Mexico)
 7/59 - 6/62 Richard Spathar TSD (retired)

Unilateral photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59	Harry T. Mahoney (retired Chicago)	56 - 68 Outside Agent Ramon Alvarez (resigned in Mexico)
5/57 - 8/64	A. Goodpasture (alternate CO - and internal routing)	
6/58 - 6/63	Louis D. Puckett (retired)	
6/63 - 10/64	Thomas Keenan -	Robert H. Feldmann
65 - 66	William Bright	56-63 - 6/68 ↓ Cubana - opt reporting Training - LA

Liaison phone taps

1959 - 1969 Winston Scott (deceased)
 1959 - 1960 Alfonso Spera (retired)
 1959 - 1960 Turner Smith (outside, now retired)
 1959 - 1960 John (Training rept resigned)
 1960- 1961 John Brady (retired)
 1962 - 1968 A. Goodpasture -
 1961 - 1971 Charles Flick (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired) -

Liaison - surveillance

Prior 1954 Robert Melberg (retired)
 3/54 - 4/59 Harry Mahoney (retired)
 4/59 - 1961 Thomas Hazlitt
 12/62 - 9/67 Robert Feldmann

TSD Outside unit

4/58 - 12/63 Glen Widden (retired) -
 6/59 - 4/64 Joseph M. Recigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

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About mid 1962 (check date) LIENVOY outside Mexi rept asked for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban, and Satellite Embassies. With this forewarning, LIFEAT (unilateral coverage) was disconnected. However, as I recall, the Mexicans connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech, 2 Polish, and 1 Yugoslav line. The basehouse listening post had a live monitor who made short summaries of interesting conversations for a daily resume which was received each day around 8 a.m. (passed by Flick to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9 a.m.) Later (when the reel was completely recorded) full transcripts were typed and passed to the station in the same way, however, there was usually a time lag of a day or so. Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of other conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed. In the case of the Russian translations, Boris Tarasoff usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the volume of Russian conversations among the members of the Soviet Embassy. During this period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may have been carried to him by Flick but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to Herbert Manell to take to Boris. Herbert Manell and his wife Barbara handled all of the processing of Soviet transcripts. My job involved screening the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself Oswald was probably an American. However, here again there was a backlag because the photos were picked up three times a week but the ones picked up were usually for dates a few days previously because the doctor processed the film on a night time basis. Photographs were made usually until one roll was used but later we got it changed to one day coverage on each roll - in other words the operators ^{for} cleared the camera each day whether there was ~~any film exposed~~ a full roll of film exposed. Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each

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new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment (a pulse camera) but it frequently developed mechanical difficulties. Bob Zambarnardi and Spathar (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna MacKay screened the film inside the station.

I am certain that the Oswald call came to our attention from the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to Boris for a translation because the caller was trying to speak Russian. Any delay was caused by waiting to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. There were no copies of transcripts ever made in languages other than Spanish or English because Win Scott could read only those two languages and he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads he wanted pursued.

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